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To the Honorable the Supreme Court of Utah: 
Defendants respectfully petition the court for a re-
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hearing of the above entitled cases, and in support of said 
petition allege: 
1. The prevailing opinion is based upon a misin-
terpretation of the facts. 
2. The prevailing opinion erroneously interprets the 
purpose of the statute involved, and therefore arrives at an 
incorrect conclusion as to its constitutionality. 
3. The court erroneously holds that plaintiffs' rights 
in pension funds to which they have contributed operate to 
make them immune from discharge. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE PREVAILING OPINION IS BASED UPON 
A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE FACTS. 
POINT II. 
THE PREVAILING OPINION ERRONEOUSLY 
INTERPRETS THE PURPOSE OF THE STAT-
UTE INVOLVED, AND THEREFORE ARRIVES 
AT AN INCORRECT CONCLUSION AS TO ITS 
CONSTITUTIONALITY. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HOLDS THAT 
PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS IN PENSION FUNDS 
TO WHICH THEY HAVE CONTRIBUTED 
ARE SUCH THAT THEY CANNOT BE DIS-
CHARGED. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PREVAILING OPINION IS BASED UPON 
A MISINTERPR-ETATION OF THE FACTS. 
The prevailing opinion (that written by Mr. Justice 
Crockett) concludes that Sec. 52-3-1, U. C. A. 1953, as 
amended by Ch. 79, Laws of Utah 1953, is unconstitutional 
as applied to these plaintiffs because of its interference 
with rights which plaintiffs had in existing employment 
by the defendant Boards of Education. It appears that the 
factual basis for the opinion is the assumption that when 
the statute took effect and was sought to be applied to 
I 
plaintiffs, they were employed by their respective Boards 
under contracts of hire covering the coming school year. 
The court states: "-under the facts here presented - Mr. 
Backman had a contract to work." (second par., p. 3 of 
greensheet opinion). The basis of the opinion is that the 
statute operates to interrupt such existing employment: 
"* * * it [the statute] proposes to interrupt and de-
stroy the employment of persons who had been lawfully 
hired and had continued to work under the identical con-
ditions for years." (first full par., p. 4; italics are those of 
the opinion). The opinion concludes that "* * * the 
retroactive effect of this statute which would prohibit em-
ployees from continuing in their erstwhile lawful employ-
ment * * *" renders it unconstitutional and invalid. 
It appears to defendants that the court turned its 
opinion upon the assumed fact that plaintiffs were under 
contract when they commenced this action. In this point 
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of the argument it is respectfully urged that the opinion 
took as a fact that which is not a fact. If the opinion's_ 
assumption is incorrect, the court can and should reverse 
the opinion heretofore issued. 
In point of actualities, neither plaintiff had a contract. 
Plaintiffs were not employed by defendants when they 
commenced these proceedings. That is why this action was 
brought. The prayers of the complaints ask this Court's 
order "* * * requiring the defendant Board of Educa- ' 
tion to enter into a contract of employment with plaintiff 
as a teacher, [or show cause why] defendant Board of 
Education should not enter into a contract with plaintiff." 
As exhibits attached to each pleading ("F" in the Backman 
Case ; "D" in the Tanner Case) are letters from the super-
intendents of defendant Boards which inform each plain-
tiff that he is not employed for the 1953-54 school year. 
Thus the court's assumption is contrary to facts plead-
ed by plaintiffs themselves. The opinion also states that 
.the Attorney General agreees that plaintiffs had a "prop-
erty right" in continued employment (second par., p. 3). 
This is contrary to the pleadings. Paragraph 4 of each 
answer denies the existence of such "rights." Counsel for 
defendants are disturbed at this reasoning employed by the 
opinion: that since an extraordinary action in this Court 
does not lie unless "rights" are in jeopardy, and since the 
propriety of this action was not contested, therefore the 
"rights" exist and are in jeopardy. Such a deductive pro-
cess -may yield invalid results, and has done so here. It 
was deemed appropriate not to raise jurisdictiona~ objec-
tions in this case because of the administrative desirability 
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of getting an expression from this state's highest judicial 
authority on a problem of state-wide concern. No admis-
sion was intended to be m3:de, or implied, as to the existence 
of "property rights" in present empl~yment, and the plead-
ings so indicate. 
The fact which emerges and which is of basic import-
ance in view of the rationale of the prevailing opinion, is 
that at present in this state teachers enter a- new, separate, 
different- contract for each school year. This is clearly 
true upon the record here, and is so well known in the 
community as to be the subject of judicial knowledge. The 
truth of this is the more graphically indicated by the action 
of the special legislative session just concluded. The 
Legislature passed H. B. No. 12, First Special Session 
1953, which when it takes effect will permit local 'boards 
to employ teachers .for terms up to five years. This is a 
clear indication that heretofore the practice has been other-
wise. It may be that after ·June 1954, some teachers in 
some districts will be in the position which the court as-
sumes presently obtains as to plaintiffs. That, of course, 
depends upon future determinations by each board as to its 
policy. Plaintiffs, at this time, do not present such a case .. 
The court's erroneous factual interpretation led it into 
the error committed. What is involved is not a "right" to 
continued employment; what is at stake is simply plaintiffs' 
liberty to seek new employment. This means that, so far 
as this case is concerned, there is no basis for the distinction 
drawn by the prevailing opinion between retroactive ap-
plications of the statute (declared void), and its applica-
tion to new employments (as to which the statute perhaps 
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can operate). In cases involving teachers in Utah schools, 
the retroactivity doctrine can have no bearing so long as 
the present system of one-year contracts obtains as the 
hiring method. The point above argued is important be-
cause large numbers of employees of the state and its sub-
divisions fit into many classifications as to method of hire, 
tenure, and so forth. It may be that defendants' counsel 
did not adequately bring to the court's attention the facts 
necessary for a correct decision. It would be unfortunate if, 
for that reasons, a large group of public employees should 
assume that they are immune from the statute only to dis-
cover one year hence, when they are not under contract, 
that the anti-nepotism statute still covers them. The court 
should face the difficult problem presented by the present 
one-year contracts under which teachers are employed, 
and adjudicate it. 
POINT II. 
THE PREVAILING OPINION ERRONEOUSLY 
INTERPRETS THE PURPOSE OF THE STAT-
UTE INVOLVED, AND THEREFORE ARRIVES 
AT AN INCORRECT CONCLUSION AS TO ITS 
CONSTITUTIONALITY. 
As defendants read the prevailing opinion, its ration-
ale is as follows: private rights and liberties can be inter-
fered with by police legislation if, but only if, (1) the 
legislation is directed at the cure of a "substantial evil" and 
(2) the evil is of comparatively greater magnitude than 
are such private rights or liberties. The epigram which is 
quoted - " 'It is unwise to burn a barn to get rid of a 
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mouse' " - reflects the theory of the opinion. Defendants 
urge, in this respect, first, that the theory is not correctly 
applied in this case; and second, that the theory is itself in-
correct, being an over-reaching by the judiciary into a field 
of government which is legislative. 
The reasoning of the opinion applies its theory to the 
facts in this fashion: the "evil" against which the statute 
is directed is the prevention of favoritism for unqualified 
relatives in public appointments. The next step is to con-
clude that since favoritism in hiring is not likely where 
teachers are concerned, the statute is without substantial 
effect in curing the evil. It follows, the opinion concludes, 
that in view of the gravity of the interference with the 
private rights of plaintiffs, and in view of the purposeless-
ness of the statute, the enactment was beyond the legisla-
tive power as applied to these plaintiffs. 
This reasoning is an elaborate restatement of the dic-
tum of State ex rel. Robinson v. Keefe, 111 Fla. 701, 149 So. 
638, which the opinion cites and quotes favorably. Defend-
ants earnestly urge that the Florida case is theoretically 
incorrect, and that it holds possibilities which may thwart 
any anti-nepotism policy the state now has, or may here-
after adopt. 
A close look at the reasoning of the Robinson case 
shows that its dictum is fallacious. The Florida court states 
that the statute involved was an "anti-nepotism" statute. 
The court then gives a dictionary definit~on of "nepotism" 
as the bestowal of political favor upon a relative because of 
kinship rather than merit. The court reasons that inasmuch 
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as the purpose of the statute is to discourage nepotism, it 
follows that, as to those whose qualifications are statutor-
, 
ily assured, an anti-nepotism statut~ is unnecessary and 
therefore unconstitutional. 
· This reasoning confuses labels with realities. Nothing 
in the Florida statute says anything about "nepotism". 
The statute before the court has nothing at all to do with 
qualifications of employees. What is. prohibited is the em-
ployment of any relative, qualified or not. Throughout 
most states the declared legislative policy is the regula-
tion or suppression, to some degree, of the practice of 
relatives working under relatives in public jobs. The exist-
ence of kinship ties is thought to be undesirable, as such, 
entirely aside from any consideration of whether the em-
ployee is qualified to do his job. This is true of every 
nepotism statute examined by counsel fqr defendants with 
the exception of the statute in effect in Montana. See sees. 
59-518 to 59-520, Rev. Code of Montana 1947. 
This is the fallacy of the Florida dictum. The purpose 
of nepotism statutes is to prohibit the employment of a 
relative even though he possesses the best possible qualifi-
cations for the job to be .filled. Under the usual statute a 
public officer cannot, for example, employ his wife as his 
secretary, and her prize-winning ability at stenography 
would not. change the effect of the law. 
Thus viewed, nepotism statutes have been sustained. 
Barton v. Alexander, 27 Ida. 286, 148 P. 4 71. That the 
practice of nepotism is thought by many to be improper is 
all the more plain when it is considered that in a libel action 
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a charge of nepotism has been held libelous per se. Pal-
merlee v. Nottage, 119 Minn. 351, 138 N. W. 312 (charge of 
"favoritism, nepotism, and malfeasance in office") ; H ous-
ton Chronicle v. Wegner (Tex., 1915) 182 S. W. 45. Its 
prohibition, should the Legislature deem it proper, is plain-
ly within legislative power. 
The important point, for this case, is that once the 
true purpose of anti-nepotism statutes is appreciated, plain-
tiffs' argument that teachers and other merit-rated em-
ployees are on such a plane as to be immune from the 
operation of an anti-nepotism statute, is without force . 
. The argument advanced above is theoretical, but it 
has practical importance in future legislation and enforce-
ment. The Florida dictum opens a way by which any 
segment of public employees might avoid a general nepotism 
statute. Some branch could adopt a system of merit-hiring 
which would have to be met before an applicant could 
qualify for a job. The purported purpose of this system 
would be to assure qualified employees; the effect would 
be to immunize the employees of such a department from 
the operation of the general nepotism statute. 
Defendants also urge the court that the theory here 
'adopted of balancing harsh private effects of a statute as 
against its efficacy in suppressing "evil" goes rather be-
yond traditional limits which this court has in the past 
imposed upon itself. Decisions about what is wise are under 
our system left to legislative policy makers. 
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POINT III~ 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HOLDS THAT 
PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS IN PENSION FUNDS 
TO WHICH THEY HAVE CONTRIBUTED 
ARE SUCH THAT THEY CANNOT BE DIS-
CHARGED. 
It appears to defendants that the single point upon 
which a majority of the justices are agreed is that plaintiffs 
have rights in pension funds which cannot be interfered 
with by their removal, as this statute proposes to do. That 
is the burden of the Chief Justice's special concurrence. 
And mention is made of such rights in the prevailing opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Crockett concurred in by Mr. Justice 
Wade (par. 2; p. 3). 
A dilemma faces plaintiffs' argument here: if their 
rights in the retirement funds are "vested", they can de-
mand delivery of money due. If the rights are not vested, 
then the statute does not impair their rights. 
The general principles in the law of pension systems 
were settled in our Utah law. On retirement, the member's 
rights vest. Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Tea- • • • • 
chers' Ret. Commn., ... U .... , 243 P. 2d 941. But prior 
to retirement, there is no right. Hansen v. Public Em-
ployees' Ret. System . ... U .... , 246 P. 2d 591. These de-
cisions make for protection of pensioners' rights ·and yet 
provide the flexibility which is requisite for continued 
actuarial improvement of retirement systems. Both rules 
are necessary. Experience has shown that improvement 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
is necessary to keep these valuable pension systems work-
able. 
In this case two new steps are taken. The decision is 
that one has rights in the fund as soon as he contributes, 
and further, that such rights mean that he thereafter is 
assured a job because his rights cannot be interfered with. 
No case has gone so far. In the Hansen case, this court 
drew the limit so far as Utah law is concerned. And it may 
be observed that the Utah cases are as diligent as any in pro-
tecting the members of retirement systems. Many states are 
not as liberal. 54 A. L. R. 943; 98 id. 505; 112 id. 1009; and 
137 id. 249. This decision is an extension beyond any case 
except Kern v. City of Long Beach, 29 Cal. 2d 848, 179 P. 
2d 803, cited by the Chief Justice. The Kern case, decided 
upon its own peculiar hardship facts, has been disapproved 
in Utah by th~ Hansen case (246 P. 2d 591, at 596), and 
the Utah Supreme Court noted in the Hansen case that 
subsequent California decisions have discredited it at home, 
citing Palaske v. City of Long Beach, 1949, 93 Cal. App. 
2d 120, 208 P. 2d 764; Allstot v. City of Long Beach, 104 
Cal. App. 2d 441, 231 P. 2d 498; Allen v. City of Long 
Beach, 101 Cal. App. 2d 15, 224 P. 2d 792; and Packer v. 
Board of Retirement, 35 Cal. 2d 212, 217 P. 2d 660. 
There is a further objection to the decision here. 
Whether or not plaintiffs possess rights in their pension 
funds is not a factor which should be permitted to determine 
that they cannot be removed from their jobs if the Legis-
lature deems that necessary. A reading of the pension 
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cases In annotations shows that the cases are concerned 
with efforts of the employer to modify or abolish the pen-
sion system itself. No case goes to the extreme of holding 
that because an employee has contributed to a system he 
cannot thereafter be discharged, or that the qualifications 
for the job which he holds cannot be altered or raised. The 
notion is startling. 
This holding of the court will be most difficult to 
apply in future cases. At the last special session the Legis-
lature abolished the local retirement systems to which 
plaintiffs belonged. See S. B. No. 23, First Special Session 
1953. Under the new law, which is now in effect, members 
may elect to withdraw contributions minus a two-year 
social security premium, or to remain as members of the 
state system, also drawing federal social security. See 
S. B. Nos. 22 and 23, First .Special Session 1953. Under the 
new retirement law, the nepotism statute cannot be held 
responsible for the destruction of plaintiffs' rights in local 
funds ; the local funds now do not even exist. The new re-
tirement law has been in effect only three days at the time 
this brief is written, and the experience and accounting 
thereunder are not sufficiently advanced to give a definite 
statement as to plaintiffs' rights under it. It should be 
plain however that the present pension situation· of plain-
tiffs is much more protected and advantageous than it was 
when the court's decision was handed down on this point. 
The effect of this change in the retirement laws upon the 
constitutionality of the nepotism statute is plainly a sub-
ject which requires a rehearing and a revision of the de-
cision heretofore stated herein. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, defendants earnestly 
urge the court to reconsider the decision rendered. Plain-
tiffs had the initiative in bringing the lawsuits, -and natur-
ally chose two "hardship" cases. (That is of course entire-
ly proper, and no criticism is meant by the ~ention of it) . 
There is justification for pointing to the adage that "hard 
cases make bad law," and for urging that departure from 
proved rules of constitutional law may in time cause more 
trouble and litigation that this immediate result is worth. 
It is submitted that the reasoning of the dissenting opinions 
filed herein is inescapable. 
Counsel for defendants confess to some puzzlement 
and concern as to the status of the statute at issue here. 
We are of course aware that the court cannot properly in 
this action decide the cases of all public employees affected 
by this statute. However, the divergence of the views of 
the justices does leave room to speculate as to the result 
of future litigation respecting the operation of this statute, 
even upon public employees whose situation is similar to 
that of plaintiffs. If the court can do so, it would be most 
desirable to have an expression of majority view as to 
future applications of the sta,tute to teachers and other 
public employees. A rehearing is particularly appropriate 
now that the legislature has repealed the local retirement 
systems to which plaintiffs and many other teachers be-
longed. If defendants are correct in their belief t~at this 
point alone (membership in a local system) was what de-
cided the cases for plaintiffs, and now is the holding of . , 
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the cases, the court should reconsider the cases in the light 
of new legislative developments which have occurred since 
the opinions were handed down. The cases should be re-
argued and reversed. / 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
JOHN· W. HORSLEY, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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